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DIVERSITY ON CORPORATE BOARDS: LIMITS
OF THE BUSINESS CASE AND THE
CONNECTION BETWEEN SUPPORTING
RATIONALES AND THE APPROPRIATE
RESPONSE OF THE LAW*
THOMAS LEE HAZEN"
Some observers suggest that diversity on corporate boards of
directors will lead to new perspectives and hence better decision
making by the board. It would seem to follow that improved decision
making will lead to better corporate performance and thus presents a
"business case" for increasing diversity on corporate boards. This
Commentary explores the limits of the business case, some of the
alternative rationales for increasing diversity on corporate boards,
and the extent to which those rationales provide a basis for the law
mandating or encouraging increased diversity. This Commentary
concludes that the recently adopted SEC rule mandating disclosure of
any policies relating to the role of diversity in board selection is a
measured response to the current rationales, although it could have
gone a bit further. Although the current rationales for increased
diversity do not provide a clear mandate for more proactive
government intervention, these rationales clearly support some form
of regulatory intervention.
For a considerable period of time, the primary argument in favor
of increasing the diversity of corporate boards was that it would result
in more successful companies.! As noted above, this is referred to as
the business case. In her most recent article, Professor Lisa Fairfax
aptly points out that the business case for diversity on corporate
* @ 2011 Thomas Lee Hazen.
** Cary C. Boshamer Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill.
1. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
of the Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. REV. 795, 795;
see also David B. Wilkins, From "Separate Is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity Is Good
for Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black
Corporate Bar, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1548, 1553-55 (2004) ("Diversity, in other words, is not
only 'good for business,' it is essential to prosperity in the global economy.").
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boards of directors has had limited success.2 As Professor Fairfax
explains, the success of the business case in demonstrating a positive
correlation between board diversity and corporate performance is
limited in at least two respects. First, the existing studies are
equivocal at best.' Second, notwithstanding the studies tending to
show a correlation, the business case has not been successful in
increasing board diversity in recent years.' Professor Fairfax
concludes that the business case should not crowd out the moral
rationale.' Professor Fairfax undoubtedly is correct that the business
case has not been as robust a foundation of increased board diversity
as proponents of an increase would prefer. There are a number of
rationales to support board diversity, and rather than simply question
the strength of the business case rationale, the question that should be
asked is whether these other rationales, when combined with the
business case, support legal rules and regulations that encourage
increased board diversity.6
Many of the existing empirical studies show a correlation
between increased board diversity and successful businesses, but a
correlation does not necessarily establish a causal relationship.' Even
beyond the problems with the existing studies that Professor Fairfax
analyzes, how do we truly judge business success? Is a company's
stock price or market capitalization the best measure? Or should
researchers be looking at profitability to measure business success? Is
success better determined by looking to a company's relative ranking
with respect to its business peers? If diverse boards are in fact better
decision makers, should that fact be empirically provable within the
first year after diversity is achieved, or is a longer view a better
measure of business success?
To date, the business case has not convinced most corporate
boards to expand their diversity significantly.' It has been suggested
that only when corporate boards become more diverse will it be
possible to study the impact of board diversity, but it seems
2. Lisa M. Fairfax, Board Diversity Revisited: New Rationale, Same Old Story?, 89
N.C. L. REv. 855, 858 (2011).
3. Id. at 860-64.
4. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 800-03.
5. Id. at 853-54.
6. I believe that increased diversity on corporate boards should be encouraged. I also
believe that there is some merit to the business case and that corporations will be better
off with more diverse boards. A distinct question is the extent to which the law should be
proactive in encouraging increased board diversity.
7. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 810; Fairfax, supra note 2, at 862.
8. Fairfax, supra note 2, at 867.
888 [Vol. 89
LIMITS OF THE BUSINESS CASE
premature to do so now given the current levels of board diversity. 9
This creates an unfortunate conundrum since it may not be possible
to engage in meaningful empirical studies until board diversity
increases and this increase may not take place in the absence of
stronger evidence of the business case.
This Commentary addresses the extent to which the business
case is important given corporate norms and the laws regulating
corporations. The Commentary concludes that the business case need
not be a driving force for those observers urging laws to promote
board diversity. Rather, if increased diversity on corporate boards can
be justified in other ways, the burden should then shift to the
objectors to show that increased diversity on boards would in fact be
inconsistent with corporate success, however that might be measured.
There may also be demonstrably negative effects of increased
board diversity,10 but that need not sound the death knell for
increased diversity. Even without strong empirical evidence, a strong
positive link between board diversity and good decision making can
be hypothesized."
The use of the business case as an exclusive basis for justifying
corporate conduct is premised on the late Professor Milton
Friedman's belief that corporations have no social responsibility
beyond making money for their shareholders.12 The necessity of
justifying board diversity exclusively or primarily on the business case
is premised not only on the for-profit nature of corporations, but also
on the common perception that corporate law is purely a matter of
private law and of contractual relationships within the corporate
9. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, The Milieu of the Boardroom and the Precinct
of Employment, 89 N.C. L. REV. 749 (2011) (arguing that research techniques applied to
diversity among employees are likely useful when applied to diversity among boards of
directors).
10. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Jiwook Jung, Corporate Board Gender Diversity and
Stock Performance: The Competence Gap or Institutional Investor Bias?, 89 N.C. L. REV.
809, 837 (2011) ("We offer another theory of the effect of board gender diversity on
corporate performance. We suggest that gender diversity may be influencing corporate
performance not by shaping the efficacy or monitoring capabilities of boards themselves,
but by activating bias on the part of the institutional investors who now control eighty
percent of the shares of America's leading companies. We suggest that if institutional fund
managers are indeed acting on gender biases and reducing the value of firms that increase
female directorships, we should see negative effects of female directors on stock value. We
suggest that if female directors are influencing stock price by altering board efficacy, we
should see effects on both profits and stock value.").
11. James A. Fanto, Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Justifying Board
Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901, 904 (2011).
12. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
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community and constituency.13 The corporate persona, however, is
not so monolithic as to preclude consideration of factors besides the
business case and profit motive.14
Corporate law most often is considered private law rather than
public law. However, there is clearly a public law aspect since the laws
that regulate corporate conduct have as much or more impact on
society outside of the corporate arena as do many public law
concerns.'" The corporate social responsibility movementl6 recognizes
13. For a discussion of the contractarian approach to corporations, see R.H. Coase,
The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 390-91 (1937) (describing the firm as an
organized way of minimizing the transaction costs of contracting and pricing); Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization,
62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 794-95 (1972) (introducing the contractarian view of the
corporation and highlighting the efficiency of a central firm engaging in a number of
bilateral contracts). See also Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, The Contract Clause
and the Corporation, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 767, 770-77 (1989) (discussing the debate over
contractarianism and competing theories of the nature of a corporation).
14. See William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for
Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1461-63 (1993) (showing the fallacies
of a pure contractarian approach). See generally Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate
Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1991)
(discussing the multifaceted nature of the corporate persona).
15. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in a New Gilded Age, 2
HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 2-5, 10-16 (2008) (discussing the potential for using corporate
law to address economic ills); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1203-05, 1273-
96 (1999) (discussing the use of SEC regulations to facilitate social responsibility of
corporations). Since the inception of the private corporation and the advent of the general
chartering statutes, there has been a great debate among scholars as to whether the
regulation of corporations is, and should be, a matter of public law or private law. See
generally Adolph Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
433 (1962) (critiquing Professor Henry Manne's theory of a corporation in terms of
laissez-faire economic principles); William C. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules,
50 CALIF. L. REV. 408 (1962) (advocating adoption of internally imposed ethical restraints
in addition to government-mandated disclosure); Alfred F. Conard, Reflections on Public
Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941 (1977) (discussing the possible role of public
interest directors in changing the corporate governance structure); Henry Manne, The
"Higher Criticism" of the Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399 (1962) (providing
an overview of the theories of the nature of a corporation from corporate democracy to
corporate constitutionalism); Bayless Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom:
Some General Analysis and Particular Reservations, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 38 (1960)
(grappling with the conflict between a corporation's power as an individual entity and
individual freedom); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate
Disclosure and Corporate Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 565 (1972) (advocating
new society-oriented disclosure requirements for corporations).
16. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy & Society: The Link Between
Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. Bus. REV., Dec. 2006,
at 78, 83 ("Successful corporations need a healthy society.... Ultimately, a healthy society
creates expanding demand for business, as more human needs are met and aspirations
grow."); Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law?, 57 EMORY
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that it is appropriate for corporations to be responsible citizens, and
as such, law may legitimately reach beyond the traditional mission of
the chartering statutes.17 In these instances, the business case is not
the primary justification for regulatory provisions imposed on
corporations.
A classic example of the law's concern for matters beyond the
business case can be found in the law relating to corporate charitable
contributions. The landmark decision discussing corporate gift giving
is found in Justice Jacobs's opinion for a unanimous New Jersey
Supreme Court in A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow." In this
case, a shareholder had challenged the use of corporate funds for a
$1,500 charitable gift to Princeton University.19 The court's analysis
traced the history of the corporation, concluding that the corporate
entity always has had a role as a responsible societal member.2 0 State
corporate statutes uniformly recognize that unless restricted by the
corporate charter, it is proper for a corporation to make charitable
donations.2 1 The foregoing shows that corporate gift giving is widely
embraced by courts and legislatures irrespective of any demonstrable
L.J. 948, 953-58 (2008) (discussing the success of corporations as instruments of social
change).
17. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets:
Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Responsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 WiS.
L. REV. 391, 394-95, 398-400, 409-10 (discussing various corporate law and securities law
provisions that go beyond the profit motive).
18. 98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953); see also, e.g., Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d 878, 879 (Del. 1970)
(upholding corporation's decision to make voluntary payment to county); Theodora
Holding Co. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 405 (Del. Ch. 1969) (upholding charitable gift
under Delaware law).
19. The plaintiff in A.P. Smith challenged the gift as a waste of corporate assets since
it resulted in no direct economic benefit to the corporation. 98 A.2d at 581-82.
20. Id. at 583-88. Specifically, the court reasoned:
When the wealth of the nation was primarily in the hands of individuals they dis-
charged their responsibilities as citizens by donating freely for charitable purposes.
With the transfer of most of the wealth to corporate hands and the imposition of
heavy burdens of individual taxation, they have been unable to keep pace with
increased philanthropic needs. They have therefore, with justification, turned to
corporations to assume the modem obligations of good citizenship in the same
manner as humans do.
Id. at 585-86. Justice Jacobs was obviously sympathetic with the views of Professors Berle
and Means with regard to the impact of the modern corporation. See ADOLPH BERLE &
GARDINER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 352-57
(1932).
21. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2001) ("Every corporation created
under this chapter shall have power to ... [mlake donations for the public welfare or for
charitable, scientific or educational purposes .... ); MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 3.02(13)
(2007) (employing similar language to the Delaware Code).
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impact on business success. Nevertheless, corporations continue to
make considerable charitable donations.22
The current acceptance of the value of corporate philanthropy
demonstrates that rationales beyond a pure business case could be
sufficient to support increased diversity on corporate boards. For
example, Professors Fanto, Solan, and Darley suggest that-
consistent with other aspects of the corporate social responsibility
("CSR") movement23-increased diversity on corporate boards will
foster new positive social agendas for public corporations.2 4 Another
potential impact of increased board diversity is the possible signaling
effect to encourage successful diversity practices throughout all levels
of the corporation.
As discussed throughout this conference, there are multifaceted
rationales for increased diversity on corporate boards. When viewed
in the aggregate, these rationales provide a strong basis for urging
increased board diversity. Policy makers' and decision makers'
evaluations of the various rationales will eventually lead to their
answer regarding what approach is preferred or would be optimal in
terms of corporate governance. Another question is the extent to
which the rationale chosen to support board diversity as a positive
value should impact the legal regime and the laws applicable to
corporate governance.
Until 2010, there were no laws or regulations directly addressing
diversity on corporate boards, but, as discussed below, new SEC rules
require disclosure of board diversity policies. 26 At the extremes, if the
business case presented a strong case, then one could argue that we
22. Press Release, GivingUSA Found., U.S. Charitable Giving Falls 3.6 Percent in
2009 to $303.75 Billion (June 9,2010), available at http://www.givingusa.org/pressreleases/
gusalgusa060910.pdf (reporting that corporate charitable contributions totaled $14.1
billion in 2009).
23. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
24. Fanto et al., supra note 11, at 935 ("[W]e feel that, if diversity advocates justify
board diversity on other grounds and norms, they could promote a transformation in the
social identity of boards. Although this transformed identity might have a subsidiary
benefit of improving board functioning, it is enough for us that it reflects and promotes
antidiscriminatory norms.").
25. Cf Patrick S. Shin & Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REv. 1017,
1027-31 (2011) (criticizing the signaling impact as too shallow a rationale to support
something as important as diversity).
26. In 2010 the SEC implemented amendments to its disclosure regulations to require
a publicly held company to disclose its policy, if any, on the role of diversity in board
selection. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010) (amending Regulation S-K to require
disclosure of "whether, and if so how, the nominating committee ... considers diversity in
identifying nominees for director"). The SEC disclosure requirement is discussed infra
notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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should require diversity on boards, just as publicly held corporations
must have a significant number of independent directors.27 Policy
makers believe that independence on corporate boards is important
to good corporate governance.28 If empirical studies ever progress to
the point where they can provide compelling support for the business
case for board diversity, then legislation or regulatory intervention
would seem appropriate. In addition, a social justice rationale for
board diversity may encourage corporations to increase diversity, but
it is not so strong as to have convinced policy makers to apply the
antidiscrimination laws to corporate boards.
As a general matter, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act promotes
equal opportunity in employment. 29 The Act's coverage depends on
the definition of employee as interpreted by the courts and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The
interpretation of employee under Title VII parallels the definition
under the National Labor Relations Act,3 0 which focuses, among
other things, on whether the alleged employment relationship makes
the putative employee "economically dependent for his livelihood on
the business to which he renders service."31 However, it is clear under
27. For a discussion of the importance of independent directors for public companies,
see 2 JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS §§ 9.2-9.3 (3d ed. 2010). The SEC did not equate the importance of
diversity with the importance of independent directors. See Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,343-44 (Dec. 23, 2009) (adopting the board
diversity policy disclosure requirement but not going further).
28. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3) (2006) (requiring independence for a membership on
audit committee); see also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-55 (2006) (requiring that the majority of
directors be independent persons). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock
Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (concluding that the growing emphasis on
independent corporate boards has been beneficial).
29. In relevant part, the Act provides that it is unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
31. Hickey v. Arkla Indus., Inc., 699 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Usery v.
Pilgrim Equip. Co., 527 F.2d 1308, 1311 (5th Cir. 1976)); see also, e.g., Bartels v.
Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) ("[I1n the application of social legislation employees
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current law that the Act's provisions do not extend to corporate
directors.
Since the Civil Rights Act does not extend its protections to
corporate boards, an alternative might be to have a direct federal
mandate with respect to corporate governance. However, corporate
governance has traditionally been left to the states.33 Substantive
corporate law in the United States is based on the state chartering
statutes that permit and define corporate existence?4 State corporate
law is largely enabling and thus would likely not be the appropriate
venue for addressing board diversity issues absent clear proof that
board diversity leads to better corporate governance. In contrast to
the chartering and governance approach of state law, which is largely
enabling, the federal securities laws focus on investor protection and
therefore work to restrict corporations that fall under their
jurisdiction." Within that mission the securities laws focus on
disclosure and providing information that investors deem significant
are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which
they render service.").
32. The EEOC concludes that board members are not employees simply by virtue of
their position on the board:
[T]he record reveals that Respondent's Board of Directors are elected by member
businesses and that their primary purpose is to set policy. They are not subject to
the control of Respondent's officers or administrative staff, nor do they receive
any compensation for performing their functions. In light of these facts, we cannot
conclude that an employee-employer relationship exists between Respondent and
its Board of Directors and that the Board's members may be considered
employees.
EEOC Decision No. 75-273, 11 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1485,1486 (1975).
33. See 1 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 27, §§ 2.4-2.5 (discussing the evolution of
modem corporate law).
34. As I have explained elsewhere:
From the earliest conception of the private corporation, the state has created a
contractual right of corporate existence in the form of the corporate charter. The
process began with the sovereign's case-by-case granting of specific charters and
has since evolved into the current scheme of general chartering statutes under
which any entity which complies with the statutory norms is entitled to a corporate
existence. These statutes, which differ from state to state, not only provide for the
necessary formalities, but also form at least a starting point for the substantive
norms of intracorporate governance. Of course, common law principles of agency
and fiduciary responsibilities also provide a major part of the law regarding the
day-to-day functioning of a corporate entity.
Hazen, supra note 17, at 392 (footnotes omitted).
35. See generally 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 1.2 (6th ed. 2009) (discussing the origins and scope of securities regulation
at the state and federal level).
2011] LIMITS OF THE BUSINESS CASE 895
in making investment decisions.3 6 For a long time the SEC has
recognized investors' interest in matters beyond a company's bottom
line."
When the SEC solicited comments regarding amendments to its
rules on proxy solicitations, it received a number of responses urging
the Commission to address board diversity." After considering the
comments, the SEC amended Regulation S-K" to require the
management of a publicly held company to disclose in its annual
proxy statement-the mechanism used to solicit shareholder votes-
the extent to which a nominating committee considers diversity in
identifying director nominees.' This requirement is relatively modest.
It does not require that a company have a policy on the role of
diversity in board nominations. Rather, it simply requires disclosure if
such a policy exists.4 1 The disclosure requirement alerts investors to
the policy and allows them to decide how to react (if at all) to the
absence of such a policy. This diversity disclosure was a relatively
small component of enhanced disclosures relating to corporate
governance. 42
36. See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340,
1340-41 (1966); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171, 173 (1933); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the
Securities Act of 1933,28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29,34-35 (1959).
The federal securities laws' concept of materiality, which draws the dividing line
between things that need to be disclosed and those that do not, focuses on what investors
deem significant. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (noting that
materiality depends on whether there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important"); accord Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988) (applying the TSC standard for materiality). "For the securities lawyer
'materiality' is the name of the game." RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD MARSH, JR.,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1023 (5th ed. 1982).
37. See, e.g., SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829-30 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (finding that improper sales practices and management integrity are material
concerns to investors, even though not directly impacting the bottom line); Franchard
Corp., Securities Act Release No. 4,710, 1964 WL 67454, at *13 (July 31, 1964) (explaining
that management integrity is a matter of shareholder concern).
38. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,334-44 (Dec. 23,
2009); see also, e.g., Letter from Lissa Lamkin Broome & Thomas Lee Hazen, Professors
of Law, Univ. of N.C., to SEC (Sept. 15, 2009), cited in Proxy Disclosure Enhancements,
74 Fed. Reg. at 68,355 n.193.
39. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2010), sets forth disclosure requirements for
SEC filings and spells out in detail with respect to the narrative portion of SEC filings
what must be disclosed and the manner in which it is to be presented.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2010).
41. Id.
42. The amendments also require more detailed disclosure of the board's leadership
structure, including whether the company has a combined or separate chief executive
officer and chairman position, and the board's role in risk oversight. § 229.407(h). In
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Although the SEC rules provide a significant first step in
recognizing the importance of board diversity and its relevance to
many investors, the rule could have done more. For example, the
SEC could have given investors even more meaningful information
on board diversity had it required disclosure of the ethnicity, race,
and gender of existing board members.43 The existing required
disclosures regarding board members and nominees have no such
requirement. Often, it is possible to discern gender from a first name,
but this is imperfect at best given the number of names that are
gender neutral. Race and ethnicity similarly cannot be discerned as a
name can be an imperfect indicator. It would be helpful for investors
to be able to identify the composition of the board in order to
determine whether the board make-up reflects adequate diversity for
those investors' interests, regardless of whether the company has a
diversity policy. This information would be helpful to investors
believing in diversity either as a matter of social justice or because of
the business case."
Although it requires disclosure of diversity policies, the SEC did
not precisely define diversity. There is some concern that the SEC's
failure to define diversity is problematic. 45 In adopting its board
diversity policy disclosure requirement, the SEC left to companies
making the disclosure "to define diversity in ways that they consider
appropriate."46 Professor Fairfax decries the failure to define diversity
as "perhaps most devastating to the rule's potential effectiveness." 47
Reasonable people can differ as to what type of diversity is beneficial
to corporate governance. Limiting the concept of diversity would
seem to be at odds with the purpose of the rule. The required
disclosures are designed to inform investors as to what diversity
policies are in place. A definition of diversity might result in unduly
limiting what investors can learn from the disclosures. The SEC noted
that diversity may include "concepts such as race, gender and national
addition, management must disclose fees paid to compensation consultants and their
affiliates in certain circumstances. § 229.407(e)(3)(iii).
43. See Letter from Lissa Lamkin Broome & Thomas Lee Hazen to SEC, supra note
38, at 2 (urging such a disclosure requirement).
44. The SEC received a number of comment letters that indicated this is the case. See
Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334,68,343 nn.116-18 (Dec. 23,2009).
45. See Fairfax, supra note 2, at 874-75.
46. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,344 ("We believe that for
purposes of this disclosure requirement, companies should be allowed to define diversity
in ways that they consider appropriate. As a result we have not defined diversity in the
amendments.").
47. Fairfax, supra note 2, at 874.
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origin."" However, the SEC observed that a company's concept of
diversity may also "include differences of viewpoint, professional
experience, education, skill and other individual qualities and
attributes."49 The absence of a definition in the SEC rules may
actually help inform investors. For example, they can determine
which companies expressly include gender, race, and ethnicity in their
diversity policies and which do not.
The SEC rulemaking on director diversity responds to various
concerns. The SEC's adoption of the board diversity policy disclosure
requirement can be seen as an acceptance of at least the
"appearance" of the business case's validity." However, its basis is
not limited to the business case. The fact that shareholders and
potential investors may be interested in board diversity is itself a
sufficient justification for disclosure.
For a long time, the SEC, in its shareholder proposal rule, has
recognized the importance of shareholder views on corporate
governance.s" The shareholder proposal rule embodies the SEC's
long-established belief that investors have a legitimate interest in the
ways in which a company's activities impact issues of major social
concern.52 The director diversity policy disclosure requirement can be
seen as consistent with investors' social responsibility concerns.
Professor Fairfax acknowledges that these diversity factors may be
significant for corporate governance, but she is concerned that what
she considers to be an inadequate definition dilutes the concept.5 3 Her
main concern is that this in turn takes away from companies'
incentives to increase diversity.54
48. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,344.
49. Id.
50. Fairfax, supra note 2, at 866 ("[T]he SEC referenced, among other things, the fact
that commentators noted the appearance of a 'meaningful relationship between diverse
boards and improved corporate financial performance.' " (quoting Proxy Disclosure
Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,344)).
51. SEC Rule 14a-8 gives shareholders access to management's proxy statements with
respect to shareholder proposals for consideration at shareholder meetings. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-8 (2010).
52. In interpreting the shareholder proposal rule, the SEC consistently concludes that
management may not exclude from its proxy statement matters of significant social
concern. See 3 HAZEN, supra note 35, § 10.8[8] (discussing the "ordinary business"
exception to the shareholder proposal rule).
53. Fairfax, supra note 2, at 874-75.
54. Id. at 875 ("The failure to define diversity could limit significantly the ability of the
SEC's new rule to alter the status quo with respect to racial and gender diversity on
boards.").
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Professor Fairfax's concern is misplaced. The SEC disclosure
requirement is not designed to shape conduct." Rather, it is designed
to inform investors how a company views the role of diversity in the
nomination of directors. 6 If investors are dissatisfied with a
company's policy or lack thereof, they can become more proactive. In
the past, investors have taken action by making shareholder proposals
to increase board diversity." If nothing else, the SEC's new disclosure
requirement will keep diversity in people's minds. Even a company
without a board diversity policy will be reminded of that fact each
year when it makes its proxy disclosures and has nothing to disclose.
In addition, the new requirement may trigger a resurgence in
shareholder proposals calling for consideration of diversity in
companies' board nomination policies. 8 In any event, a disclosure
approach seems commensurate with the current rationales and
evidence favoring board diversity.
More compelling data supporting the business case for increasing
diversity on corporate boards could justify statutory or regulatory
intervention. As explained above, typically the state of incorporation
sets the rules for corporate governance, so there would be an
appropriate forum for corrective legislation if warranted by the
business case. Only in extreme cases has federal legislation ventured
into corporate governance.5 9 The current state of the business case for
board diversity is at best equivocal, based on the current empirical
evidence. Accordingly, there does not appear to be sufficient
justification at this time for a federally mandated corporate
governance structure that would include board diversity.
Alternatively, federal civil rights legislation could provide an
appropriate forum for addressing board diversity through inclusion in
Title VII protections. While this may be warranted at some point in
the future, it seems premature at this juncture, given the inconclusive
55. See Hazen, supra note 17, at 409-12.
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Cypress Semiconductor Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 113674,
at *1 (Mar. 11, 1998) (stating that management could not exclude from its proxy statement
a shareholder proposal requesting "that the Company: (1) make a greater effort to find
qualified women and minority candidates for nomination to its board of directors; (2) issue
a public statement committing the Company to a policy of board inclusiveness with a
program to further these goals; and (3) issue a report describing its efforts to encourage
diversified representation on the board, its criteria for board qualification and the process
of selecting board candidates and committee members").
58. See, e.g., Smithfield Foods, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2010 WL 1974680, at *7
(June 24, 2010) (discussing a proposal relating to mutual funds' voting practices and urging
that diversity in board nomination be a factor).
59. See 1 Cox & HAZEN, supra note 27, § 2.5 (discussing modern corporation laws).
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empirical support of the business case. Neither the business case nor
other rationales present a strong enough case to warrant laws
compelling increased board diversity. Better empirical data could
help bring us to this point.
Given the current state of the data, a disclosure approach seems
best. As mentioned earlier, however, the SEC should go further than
it has and require more than disclosure of board nomination criteria.
The interests of investors (especially those committed to CSR) would
be even better served by disclosure of the race, gender, and ethnicity
of both sitting board members and also of nominees for the board of
directors. Such an approach, however, could have a backlash among
those interested in perpetuating boards dominated by white males.'
Nevertheless, the rationales supporting increased diversity and the
apparent concerns of investors, including institutional investors such
as CalPERS,6 1 suggest that increased disclosure would not have such
deleterious effects.
The SEC took a significant step with its board diversity policy
disclosure requirement. This will provide investors with information
regarding the extent to which corporate boards value diversity. In
furtherance of this goal, the SEC should consider expanding the rule
to require disclosure of the race, gender, and ethnicity of current
board members. Over time, there may be a more robust business case
that would justify even more proactive government intervention.
However, until that occurs, the SEC's current disclosure approach is a
well-measured, albeit not perfect, regulatory response.
60. Cf Dobbin & Jung, supra note 10, at 812, 821-22 (suggesting that such a bias
might exist).
61. CalPERS is the California Public Employees' Retirement System and has been a
very proactive shareholder in terms of corporate governance. See CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES'
RET. SYS., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7, 9
(2010), available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/docs-soflprinciples/2010-5-2-global-
principles-of-accountable-corp-gov.pdf (advancing a series of principles for accountable
corporate governance, including board diversity, that it believes will lead to "sustainable
investment returns").
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